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If Per Se Is Dying, Why Not in TV 
Tying?  A Case for Adopting the Rule of 




[W]e should not abdicate that role [under the Sherman Act] by 
formulation of per se rules with no justification other than the 
enhancement of predictability and the reduction of judicial 
investigation. . . .  1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
On July 2, 1890, Congress passed the Sherman Act2 in response 
to an industrial society that was prospering as a result of new 
inventions.3  These inventions greatly contributed to the growth of 
the new economy and to the growth of large trusts that had begun 
to dominate that new economy.4  While the primary purpose of the 
Sherman Act was to combat trusts,5 the language of the Act 
extended to other types of arrangements that had the potential of 
restraining trade.6  In fact, after the trust-busts in the oil and 
                                                          
* B.A., Classics, College of the Holy Cross, 1998; J.D., Fordham University School of 
Law, 2001.  I would like to dedicate this piece to my brother and my sister, and to thank 
my mother for enabling me to reach this achievement. 
1 United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 622 (1972) (Burger, C. J., dissenting). 
2 Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 
1 (2001)). 
3 See Violations of Antitrust Act of 1890: Hearing on H.R. Con. Res. 139, H.R. Con. Res. 
29, and H.R. Con. Res. 813 Before the House Comm. on Rules, 62nd Cong. 4 (1911) 
(statement of Rep. Augustus Stanley, Member, House Comm. on Rules). 
4 See Howard L. Peck, The Sherman Antitrust Law From Its Legal and Economic 
Standpoint: Is It Effective 1 (1912) (unpublished L.L.B. dissertation, Yale Law School) 
(on file with Yale Law School). 
5 Id. at 6. 
6 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994) (providing that [e]very contract, combination in the form of trust 
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tobacco industries with which the Sherman Act is most often 
associated,7 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to test the 
breadth of Section 1 and found that it curbed intellectual property 
rights.8 
When enacting the Copyright Act of 1909,9 Congress had two 
policies in mind: to provide an incentive to authors to reap the 
fruits of their labor, and to facilitate public dissemination of those 
works.10  Thus, a tension exists between encouraging inventions by 
granting authors a copyright or patent monopoly while at the same 
time ensuring that this monopoly does not restrain trade.11  
Nowhere is this tension more visible than in a tying arrangement 
involving intellectual property.12 
Generally, a tying arrangement occurs where a party will sell 
one product only if the buyer also purchases another product.13  
Many of the tying cases involving intellectual property have been 
                                                                                                                                  
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or 
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.). 
7 See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. 
Am. Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). 
8 Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912) (stating that 
[r]ights conferred by patents are indeed very definite and extensive, but they do not give 
any more than other rights an [sic] universal license against positive prohibitions.); see 
also United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (declaring that 
the copyright laws, like the patent statutes, make reward to the owner a secondary 
consideration.). 
9 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909) (repealed 1976). 
10 H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909) (stating that [t]he enactment of the copyright 
legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not based upon any natural 
right that the author has in his writings . . . but upon the ground that the welfare of the 
public will be served and progress of science and useful arts will be promoted by 
securing to authors for limited periods the exclusive rights to their writings.). 
11 See WARD S. BOWMAN, JR., PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW, A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
APPRAISAL 1 (1973); see also LAURENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTIRTUST LAW 31 
(1942). 
12 See Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 667 (1944) (quoting 
Henry v. A.B. Dick Co., 224 U.S. 1 (1912) (White, C.J., dissenting)) (stating that[s]uch 
a vast power to multiply monopolies at the will of the patentee would carve out 
exceptions to the Antitrust laws which Congress has not sanctioned.). 
13 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461 (1992) 
(quoting N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1958)); Fields Prod. Inc. v. 
United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
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brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.14  Although cases 
litigated under the Act during the Acts first twenty years had the 
misfortune of facing an interpretation that invalidated all restraints 
of trade,15 in 1911 the Court adopted the rule of reason standard by 
construing the language in Section 1 as forbidding only 
unreasonable restraints.16 
Under the rule of reason standard, courts balance all the 
competitive harms and benefits of a particular business 
arrangement before labeling it an unreasonable restraint of trade.17  
However, once experience with a particular type of arrangement 
enables a court to predict that the rule of reason would condemn it, 
that arrangement is considered to be illegal per se under the 
Sherman Act.18 
The per se standard presumes that certain business arrangements 
are illegal because of their pernicious effect on trade without 
inquiry as to the arrangements harm or redeeming virtue.19  
However, even if a court has typically categorized certain business 
arrangements as per se violations of Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act20, the inquiry often does not end there.21  The per se standard, 
                                                          
14 See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1940); Intl 
Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. 
Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). Although this note focuses on cases 
brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, Section 3 of the Clayton Act also prohibits 
tie-in sales that may substantially restrain trade.  See 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1997). 
15 See WOOD, supra note 11, at 28. 
16 See Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). 
17 See Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) (explaining 
that the reasonableness of a particular restraint involves consideration of the facts 
peculiar to the business in which the restraint is applied, the nature of the restraint and its 
effects, and the history of the restraint and the reasons for its adoption). 
18 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332 (1982). 
19 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
20 Id. (stating that [a]mong the practices which the courts have heretofore deemed to be 
unlawful in and of themselves are price fixing, division of markets, group boycotts, and 
tying arrangements.). 
21 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 18 (1983)(stating that 
any inquiry must focus on whether distributors are selling two separate products that 
may be tied together, and if so, whether they have used their market power to force the 
tying product); Bd. of Regents v. Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn, 707 F.2d 1147, 1154 
(10th Cir. 1983) (considering a least restrictive means test and business justification a per 
se illegal price fixing arrangement); Todd J. Anlauf, Severing Ties With the Strained Per 
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therefore, potentially enables courts to evaluate all business 
arrangements with the same costs as the rule of reason standard.22  
As a result, courts evaluating business arrangements that are 
categorized as illegal per se have saved little time on the docket.  
Moreover, relegating an arrangement to the per se category has 
restricted market growth in areas where the particular arrangement 
may not have caused an unreasonable restraint of trade. 
Recognizing this Scylla and Charybdis of Section 1 analysis, the 
Supreme Court recently released vertical price-fixing from the 
chains of per se illegality in State Oil Co. v. Khan.23  Although 
State Oil did not deal with tying arrangements involving 
intellectual property, its holding reaffirms the Courts recent 
willingness to withdraw vertical arrangements from per se 
illegality.24  Indeed, this landmark decision has already led to a call 
for the rule of reason standard in block-booking, a tying 
arrangement that has been just as entrenched in per se illegality as 
vertical price-fixing had once been.25 
Block-booking occurs when a distributor of visual programming 
ties or licenses one feature or group of features on condition that 
the exhibitor will also license another feature or group of features 
released by the same distributor.26  This special tying arrangement 
potentially violates Section 1 by forcing an exhibitor to accept 
features the exhibitor would otherwise not choose, thereby denying 
other exhibitors access to these features and depriving all 
distributors of an opportunity to license their features to the 
                                                                                                                                  
Se Test for Antitrust Tying Liability: The Economic and Legal Rationale For A Rule of 
Reason, 23 HAMLINE L. REV. 476, 491 (2000) (stating that even where the Supreme Court 
deploys the strict per se rule, some business justifications have been entertained by the 
court). 
22 See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 491 (explaining that [a] business justification factor 
imputed into tying arrangement analysis may be closely analogous to the rule of reason 
approaches adopted in other areas of antitrust law such as monopolization) (quoting 
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985)). 
23 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997). 
24 Id. at 10 (explaining that the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the 
antitrust laws are evaluated under the rule of reason standard). 
25 See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Six W. Retail Acquisition 
v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000). 
26 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156 (1948). 
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coerced exhibitor.27  Although the Supreme Court began applying 
the per se standard to tying arrangements outside of the context of 
block-booking,28 the opportunity to extend this standard to block-
booking arrangements arose in United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc.29 
Paramount Pictures, involving block-booking in the motion 
picture industry,30 illustrates the Courts attempt to prevent a 
licensing practice in an industry dominated by five major movie 
distributors who were accused of engaging in other anti-
competitive behavior at that time.31  While the Court appreciated 
the narrow scope of its holding,32 this case has been cited as a clear 
declaration of block-bookings illegality under the Sherman Act.33  
Because the Supreme Court has extended the rule of reason 
standard to various business arrangements in the name of free 
enterprise,34 the Court should revisit the issue of block-booking in 
light of the special circumstances of the television industry. 
This note examines the current per se illegal status of block-
booking in the television industry.  Although block-booking 
                                                          
27 See Fields Prod. Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
28 The majority of these cases involve patent law.  See Intl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 
U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); see also N. 
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958) (determining that it is unreasonable, per 
se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial market by tying arrangements); 
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949) (stating that 
[t]ying arrangements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of competition). 
29 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
30 See id. at 156. 
31 See id. at 140-41. 
32 Id. at 159 (stating that [w]e do not suggest that films may not be sold in blocks or 
groups, when there is no requirement, express or implied, for the purchase of more than 
one film. All we hold to be illegal is a refusal to license one or more copyrights unless 
another copyright is accepted.). 
33 See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 39 (1962); 
Six W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000). 
34 See, e.g., Contl Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 58-59 (1977) 
(overruling Schwinn and its per se invalidation of vertical restraints in the franchise 
system); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31-32 (1984) 
(holding that a particular tying arrangement, traditionally a per se violation, is not 
inherently anti-competitive where the seller does not have market power). 
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arrangements run the risk of unreasonably restraining trade,35 this 
note argues that that risk is substantially lessened in the television 
industry. 
Part I of this note addresses the most recent case to evaluate a 
block-booking arrangement in the television industry and examines 
the general rationale behind per se illegality in block-booking 
arrangements.  Part I then presents other cases involving the bulk 
licensing of intellectual property, to which the Court has refused to 
attach per se illegality, as a model for how block-booking might 
also be released from the per se category.  Part II examines the 
arguments both for and against continuing to evaluate block-
booking arrangements under the per se standard.  Finally, Part III 
argues that block-booking arrangements in the television industry 
are not sufficiently anti-competitive to warrant a per se standard of 
illegality.  Part III concludes that relying on the rule of reason 
standard to evaluate block-booking agreements would enhance 
competition in the television industry. 
  
I. 
The stigma that results when courts relegate a business 
arrangement to the per se category decreases the chance that such 
an arrangement will be upheld, even if the arrangement did not 
necessarily cause a restraint of trade.  A recent example of how the 
per se stigma stifled competition where a block-booking 
arrangement would have enhanced competition occurred in MCA 
Television Ltd. v. Public Interest Corp.36 
Public Interest Corporation (PIC) was a Florida corporation that 
owned and operated television station WTMV-TV in Lakeland, 
Florida.37  MCA owned and licensed syndicated television 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750, 752 
(1960). 
36 171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999). 
37 Id. at 1268. 
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programs.38  PIC alleged that MCAs conditioning its licensing of 
several first-run television shows on the willingness of PIC to 
license another first-run series called Harry and the Hendersons 
(hereinafter Harry) constituted an illegal tying arrangement.39  
PIC agreed to this arrangement, but it would not have chosen to 
license Harry had it not been a condition to licensing the other 
shows.40  When PIC fell behind on the cash portion of the Harry 
contract, MCA sued PIC for breach of contract and copyright 
infringement.41  PIC appealed the district courts finding for MCA 
and MCA cross-appealed the courts determination that MCAs 
conditioning of the initial contracts on PICs licensing of Harry 
constituted an antitrust violation in the form of block-booking.42  
The Eleventh Circuit refused to remove the per se stigma in this 
arrangement between an independent network and MCA, a 
distributor and licensor of copyrighted features.43  MCA argued 
that in State Oil Co. v. Khan,44 the Supreme Court overruled the 
per se standard of illegality in the context of vertical maximum 
price-fixing and provided dicta that would permit courts to 
evaluate other vertical arrangements under the rule of reason 
standard.45  However, the Eleventh Circuit halted that wave of 
change by refusing to apply the rule of reason standard in MCA.46 
The rationale for maintaining a per se approach to prevent anti-
competitive effects is the same in every tying arrangement.  First, 
sellers who engage in tying arrangements force buyers to forego 
the purchase of a substitute for the tied product.47  This forced 
purchase of the tied product denies market access to other suppliers 
                                                          
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 1269. 
40 Id. at 1268. 
41 MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 1999). 
42 Id. at 1269. 
43 Id. at 1277-78. 
44 522 U.S. 3 (1997). 
45 Id. at 10 (explaining that the majority of commercial arrangements subject to the 
antitrust laws are evaluated under the rule of reason standard). 
46 See, e.g., MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1277-78 (rejecting plaintiffs assertion that in 
State Oil the Supreme Court held that the correct standard to be applied when assessing 
the legality of tying arrangements is the rule of reason standard). 
47 See Times-Picayune Publg Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953). 
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of that product.48  While these anti-competitive effects are most 
likely to occur where the seller has sufficient economic leverage 
in the market of the tying product to induce his customers to take 
the tied product along with the tying item,49 the Supreme Court has 
found sufficient economic leverage where the tying product is 
unique.50  An example of uniqueness arises in the case of 
copyrighted materials packaged in a television block-booking 
arrangement,51 as illustrated in MCA. 
The rationale for finding sufficient economic leverage in cases 
involving copyrighted products derives from patent law cases52 and 
the Copyright Act itself.53  Courts have always feared that the 
copyright or patent holder may tie an inferior product to the 
product under copyright or patent protection, thus shielding the 
inferior program from having to stand on its own merits in the 
marketplace.54  Similarly, the holder of the copyrighted monopoly 
                                                          
48 See Intl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947); see also Black v. 
Magnolia Liquor Co., 355 U.S. 24, 26 (1957) (stating that [a] wholesaler who compels a 
retailer to buy an unwanted inventory as a condition to acquisition of needed articles 
exacts a quota from the retailer and excludes sales by competing wholesalers in the 
statutory sense.). 
49 See United States v. Loews Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48 (1962) (affirming United States v. 
Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948)). 
50 See id. 
51 See id. (agreeing with the district courts determination that a copyrighted film block-
booked for television use is in itself a unique product with sufficient economic power to 
impose an appreciable restraint on free competition). 
52 See, e.g., Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 456 (1940) (stating that 
a patentee may not condition his license so as to tie the use of the patented device or 
process to the use of other devices, processes or materials which lie outside of the 
monopoly of the patented license.). See also Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 
320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 
(1942). 
53 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2001). 
54 See, e.g., Motion Pictures Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917) 
(finding that conditioning the sale of a patented projector on use of the patentees films 
constituted an illegal tie in); see also B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941) 
(declaring that a firm that owned the patented process for reinforcing shoe insoles could 
not supply shoe manufacturers with the unpatented materials needed to utilize the 
process); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941) (holding illegal 
under the Sherman Act a tying arrangement conditioning machine leases on the purchase 
of salt tablets). 
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who distributes features in a block-booking arrangement extends 
that monopoly beyond the Copyright Acts intended protection.55 
Although preventing the extension of a copyright or patent 
monopoly was the rationale for relegating block-booking to the per 
se category of illegality,56 another case to address copyrighted 
materials in a bulk sale context illustrates a permissive stance 
toward exploitation of the copyright, thus distinguishing 
copyrighted works from their patented counterparts.57  In 
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.58 the 
Court carved out an exception to the per se standard in cases 
involving the block sale of copyrighted materials59 in the form of a 
blanket license.60  The Court examined the special conditions of 
the music industry to sidestep the strict per se approach.61  A 
blanket license involves a tying arrangement whereby composers 
and publishers join an organization to set one price for a bundle of 
goods without the opportunity for individual negotiation of each 
                                                          
55 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that even 
where all the films of the package are of equal quality, the requirement that all be taken if 
one is desired increases the market for some and adds to the monopoly of the copyright); 
see also Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750, 753 (1960) 
(stating that enlargement of the copyright principle is condemned in reliance on the 
principle which forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use on the use of other 
patented or unpatented materials). The rationale is the same even in the context of tying 
arrangements not involving copyrighted or patented materials.  See, e.g., Jefferson Parish 
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 15 (1984) (stating that if power is used to impair 
competition on the merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be 
insulated from competitive pressures). 
56 See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157 (explaining that the district court condemned 
the enlargement of the copyright by relying on the principle which forbids the patent 
owner to condition its use on the purchase or use of other patented or unpatented 
materials). 
57 See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979) 
(holding that the issuance of blanket licenses by ASCAP and BMI is not per se unlawful 
under the antitrust laws). 
58 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
59 See id. 
60 Blanket licenses give licensees the right to perform any and all of the compositions 
owned by the members or affiliates as often as the licensees desire for a stated term. 
61 See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (stating that the blanket license accompanies the 
integration of sales, monitoring, and enforcement against unauthorized copyright use.); 
see also id. (stating that individual sales transactions in the industry are quite expensive, 
as would be individual monitoring and enforcement, especially in light of the resources of 
single composers.). 
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song.62  However, because the members of the organizations63 in 
Broadcast Music64 could individually license performances to 
television networks and the organizations could not insist on the 
blanket license,65 the Court found that television networks had a 
genuine economic choice.66  This economic choice, together with 
the special circumstances of the music industry,67 enabled the 
Court to deny application of the per se rule.68  The Courts inquiry 
into the nature of the music industry in Broadcast Music has set a 
precedent for discriminating against the per se approach in 
copyrighted materials depending on an industrys circumstances.69 
In two cases involving a practice specific to the motion picture 
industry, the industry in which block-booking was first 
condemned,70 courts have permitted the exploitation of the 
copyright in sales involving the licensing of feature films.71  Both 
                                                          
62 Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. American Socy of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 741 
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) (stating that ASCAP was organized as a clearinghouse for copyright 
owners and users to solve problems associated with the licensing of music). 
63 ASCAP and BMI. 
64 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
65 Id. at 11. 
66 Id. 
67 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997). 
68 See Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 20 (quoting White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 
U.S. 253, 263 (1963)) (stating that the blanket license, as we see it, is not a naked 
restraint of trade with no purpose except the stifling of competition.). 
69 See, e.g., Nynex Corp. v. Discon Inc., 525 U.S. 128 (1998)(holding that the per se 
group boycott rule does not apply to a single buyers decision to buy from one seller 
rather than from another in the telecommunications industry). Compare Arizona v. 
Maricopa County Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 349-51 (1982) (stating that per se treatment 
is appropriate once experience with a particular kind of restraint enables the Court to 
predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it), with White Motor Co. v. 
United States, 372 U.S. 253, 263 (1963) (explaining that we need to know more about the 
actual impact of these arrangements on competition before deciding whether they should 
be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act), and Fed. Trade Commn v. Ind. 
Fedn of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 458-59 (1986) (indicating that the Court will not adopt a 
per se standard where the economic impact of certain practices is not immediately 
obvious). 
70 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948). 
71 Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987), 
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988) (stating that clearances that a movie theater received 
from its distributor encouraged interbrand competition by forcing competitors to find 
alternative subrun movies to exhibit and promote); Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 
79 F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996) (permitting the practice of exclusively licensing films 
to exhibitors in a prescribed area, also known as clearances). 
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the Third and Ninth Circuits upheld clearances 72 in Orson, Inc. v. 
Miramax Film Corp.73 and Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pacific 
Theatres Inc.74 
In the motion picture industry, film distributors grant clearances 
by licensing films to theaters for exhibition for a given amount of 
time.75  In Orson76 and Theee Movies of Tarzana,77 the license was 
exclusive so that the film was not licensed to other exhibitors for a 
specific duration.78  Because this practice provided the film 
distributor who held the copyright with the opportunity to 
discriminate among theaters,79 the practice was arguably an 
exploitation of the copyright monopoly contra to the patent cases 
relied upon to reject block-booking in Paramount Pictures.80  
Moreover, the power to exploit the copyright monopoly and 
thereby restrain trade was potentially greater in an exclusive 
contract. 
An exclusive contract that gave certain theaters first preference 
in the release of films was more dangerous than a block-booking 
arrangement.  A films profitability is directly related to the length 
of its run, with a first run producing greater box office profits than 
subsequent  runs.    However,  the  Orson  court  had  no  reason  to 
                                                          
72 Orson, 79 F.3d at 1362; Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399 (stating that [i]n 
the motion picture industry, film distributors license films to theaters for exhibition for a 
given amount of time. Frequently, the license is exclusive, providing that during its 
duration, the film will not be licensed to other exhibitors in a prescribed area. Such 
licenses are called clearances.). 
73 79 F.3d 1358 (3d Cir. 1996). 
74 828 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1987). 
75 See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1362. 
76 79 F.3d 1358. 
77 828 F.2d 1395. 
78 Id. 
79 Theee Movies of Tarzana v. Pac. Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1987) 
(quoting Naumkeag Theatres Co., Inc. v. New England Theatres Inc., 345 F.2d 910, 912 
(1st Cir. 1965)) (stating that [t]he whole system of runs and clearances discriminates 
between competing exhibitors.). 
80 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948) (citing Ethyl 
Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940)); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent 
Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 
(1942). 
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believe that the rule of reason standard could not adequately 
sanction or condemn the practice.81 
The Paramount Pictures Court also addressed the issue of 
clearances, finding the particular arrangement an unreasonable 
restraint of trade,82 but refused to relegate the practice to per se 
illegality.83  Indeed, the Courts decision to refrain from 
categorizing clearances as per se illegal in 194884 enabled other 
courts to permit the practice where it enhanced competition.85 
Because the Supreme Court has previously tailored Sherman Act 
jurisprudence to the circumstances of an industry86 and recognized 
that exploiting a copyright may not always result in unreasonable 
restraints of trade,87 block-booking may no longer warrant per se 
illegality under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.88  On the other hand, 
the Courts recent declaration of the usefulness of the per se 
standard for arrangements not formally removed from the 
category,89 indicates that block-booking may forever remain 
stigmatized as illegal per se.90 
                                                          
81 Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996). 
82 Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 147 (agreeing with the District Court that the 
evidence supported the finding of a conspiracy to restrain trade by imposing unreasonable 
clearances). 
83 Id. at 145 (stating that [t]he Department of Justice maintained below that clearances 
are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act. But that is a question we need not consider, 
for the District Court ruled otherwise and that conclusion is not challenged here.). 
84 Id. 
85 See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1367; see also Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399. 
86 See e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 
441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
87 See Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1367 (3d Cir. 1996). 
88 See Peck, supra note 4, at 6. 
89 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (reaffirming that some forms of 
restraint on trade have such limited potential for pro-competitive benefit and such 
predictable and pernicious anti-competitive effect, that they are deemed unlawful per se). 
90 But see id. at 4 (reasoning that [s]tare decisis is not an inexorable command, 
particularly in the area of antitrust law, where there is a competing interest in recognizing 
and adapting to changed circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience.). 
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A. Block-Booking Should Continue to be Evaluated under a Per Se 
Approach. 
Where a plaintiff proves conduct that falls within a per se 
category, nothing more is needed for liability; the defendants 
power, illicit purpose and anticompetitive effect are all said to be 
irrelevant.91 For a practice to warrant per se illegality, a court 
must have enough experience with a particular practice to know 
that the alternative rule of reason standard would condemn it.92 
While only a few business practices have made it into the per se 
category,93 the costs savings pursuant to the per se standard are 
greater than the loss of any benefits that might potentially result 
from these arrangements should they prove to be reasonable.94 
Thus, with the exception of price-fixing arrangements to which the 
per se standard no longer applies,95 the Supreme Court has guarded 
its duty under the Sherman Act by refusing to lift tying 
arrangements from per se status.96 
The Supreme Court created the per se standard for tying 
arrangements in Intl Salt Co. v. United States97 because tying 
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition by 
foreclosing entry to the market in the tied product.98  Even in its 
more recent tying analysis,99 the Court has articulated that the per 
se standard reflects congressional concern about the anti-
                                                          
91 Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found. Inc., 152 F.3d 48, 51 (1st Cir. 1998); see, 
e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). 
92 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 349-50 (1982). 
93 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (explaining that price fixing, 
division of markets, group boycotts, and tying arrangements have all been declared per se 
illegal). 
94 See Maricopa, 457 U.S. at 344 n.14 (citing F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET 
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 438-43 (1970)). 
95 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 18 (1997). 
96 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (reasoning that 
[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition 
that certain tying arrangements pose an acceptable risk of stifling competition and 
therefore are unreasonable per se.). 
97 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947). 
98 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 10-12. 
99 See id. at 11-20. 
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competitive character of tying arrangements.100 Thus, any attempt 
to evaluate these arrangements under the rule of reason must be 
cautiously made. 
Although circuit courts bravely evaluating tying arrangements 
beyond the strict per se approach are split on the exact analysis,101 
it is clear that no court has evaluated the practice under a full rule 
of reason standard.102 The reluctance of courts to adopt the rule of 
reason for tying arrangements reflects the degree to which these 
arrangements potentially restrain trade.103  At the very least, 
officially keeping tying arrangements in the per se category causes 
courts to proceed with added caution.104 
One area in which the tying arrangement has great potential to 
unreasonably restrain trade is in the block-booking arrangement.105 
As previously noted, the result of the block-booking arrangement 
is to extend the copyright monopoly.106 Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has dealt with enough patent monopolization cases107 and motion 
                                                          
100 Id. at 10 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 627, at 10-13 (1914)). 
101 Compare Crawford Transp. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964) 
(requiring the distributor to receive a direct economic benefit from sales of a tied product 
to violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act), with Gonzalez v. St. Margarets House Hous. 
Dev. Fund Corp., 880 F.2d 1514, 1516-17 (2d Cir. 1989) (rejecting the direct benefit test 
and requiring five elements including: a tying and tied product; actual coercion by the 
seller for the buyer to accept the tied product; sufficient economic leverage in the tying 
product; anti-competitive effects in the tied market; and involvement of a not 
insubstantial amount of interstate commerce in the tied market). 
102 See, e.g., White v. Rockingham Radiologists, Ltd., 820 F.2d 98 (4th Cir. 1987); Carl 
Sandburg Vill. Condo. Assn v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203, 210-11 (7th Cir. 
1985); Midwestern Waffles, Inc. v. Waffle House, Inc., 734 F.2d 705 (11th Cir. 1984). 
103 N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958) (reasoning that tying 
agreements serve little purpose beyond the suppression of competition). 
104 See, e.g., Yentsch v. Texaco, Inc., 630 F.2d 46, 58 (2d Cir. 1980) (recognizing 
considerable logic for using the direct economic benefit criterion even though the court 
did not have occasion to adopt the requirement); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 
2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9 (1984) (indicating that it is far too late to remove certain tying 
arrangements from the per se standard). 
105 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (stating that 
[e]ven where all the films included in the package are of equal quality, the requirements 
that all be taken if one is desired increases the market for some. Each stands not on its 
own footing but in whole or in part on the appeal which another film may have.). 
106 See id. 
107 See, e.g., Intl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Mercoid Corp. v. 
Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 320 U.S. 680 (1944) (hereinafter Mercoid II); 
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picture block-booking cases108 for lower courts to declare with 
certainty that television block-booking is also an unreasonable 
restraint of trade.109  When a television programming distributor 
forces a television exhibitor110 to accept an inferior program in a 
tying arrangement, he or she impedes other distributors from 
bidding for that exhibitors time slot111 while obtaining an above 
market price for the inferior tied product.112  In the case of the 
small network,113 tying results in a clear absence of economic 
choice.114  The small network must forego the opportunity to 
exhibit a superior program from another distributor in the tied 
programs time slot.115 Since television program tying is bound to 
                                                                                                                                  
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944) (hereinafter Mercoid I); 
B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 
314 U.S. 488 (1942); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 
502 (1917). 
108 See United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 
131. 
109 See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 1999); 
Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six 
W. Retail Acquisition Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that [o]nce experience with a particular 
kind of restraint enables the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will 
condemn it, it has applied a conclusive presumption that the restraint is unreasonable.). 
110 See, e.g., MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1265; Pape Television,  277 F.2d at 750. 
111 See Fields Prod. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) 
(explaining that in the motion picture industry, block-booking has been found to deprive 
competing distributors of an opportunity to license their own movies to the coerced 
theaters). 
112 See Times-Picayune Publg. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 605 (1953) (stating 
that by conditioning his sale of one commodity on the purchase of another, a seller 
coerces the abdication of buyers independent judgment as to the tied products merits 
and insulates it from the competitive stresses of the open market.). 
113 See MCA Television, 171 F.3d at 1268 (explaining that Public Interest Corporation 
was a Florida corporation that owned and operated television station WTMV-TV in 
Lakeland, Florida); Pape Television, 277 F.2d at 751 (stating that Pape Television also 
ran a station in Alabama). 
114 See Broadcast Music, Inc., v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 2 (1979) 
(indicating that the positive aspect of the ASCAP blanket license was that it offered the 
applicant a genuine economic choice). See also Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 
F.3d 1358, 1372 (3d Cir. 1996) (indicating that alternative sources of supply negated the 
anti-competitive effects of the movie clearances). 
115 See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 
1999) (stating that in determining the coercive use of the distributors copyright, the court 
would not rely on the fact that the exhibitor found the programs that it wanted appealing, 
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result in such an unreasonable restraint of trade,116 the Supreme 
Court, addressing television block-booking, would likely reaffirm 
its holding in Paramount Pictures117 that block-booking is per se 
illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.118  Indeed, the unique 
nature of the copyright monopoly119 and policy behind that 
monopoly requires the Court to reaffirm its initial position.120 
That the syndicated licensor reaps added benefits by tying 
products that he did not create is further reason to continue with 
the per se standard.  Although Congress grants the copyright 
monopoly to encourage the public dissemination of useful 
works,121 a copyright holder does not serve the public interest by 
offering to license a work without regard to the quality of the 
copyright.122 Because block-booking results in the forcing of an 
inferior film by attaching it to a quality film, the rationale of 
disseminating useful works is compromised.123 
                                                                                                                                  
but to the fact that it found the unwanted programs unappealing). 
See also Paddock Publn Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 47 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(noting that Babylon 5, a television program, appeared exclusively on WPWR-TV 
(Channel 50) in Chicago and almost all other shows are exhibited exclusively on one 
channel per locale, and sticking with that station for their entire original production run, 
even though individual stations or producers may not have had market power.). 
116 See Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 723 (1988) (explaining that 
virtually all business agreements restrain trade to some extent; Section 1, therefore, has 
been construed to make illegal only those contracts that constitute unreasonable restraints 
of trade); United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948) (stating that [a] 
restraint may be unreasonable either because an otherwise reasonable restraint is 
accompanied by a specific intent to accomplish a forbidden restraint or because it falls 
within the class of restraints that are illegal per se.). 
117 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
118 See MCA Television Ltd., 171 F.3d at 1278 (reasoning that the Supreme Court has 
twice declared that block-booking contracts are among those economic arrangements that 
will always merit a finding of per se illegality.). 
119 See United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 619 (1977) 
(stating that the copyright monopolies in Paramount Pictures and Loews represented 
tying products that the court regarded as sufficiently unique to give rise to a presumption 
of economic power.). 
120 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968) 
(stating that courts must take the Copyright Act as they find it and only Congress may 
accommodate various competing considerations of copyright, communications and 
antitrust policy.). 
121 See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909). 
122 See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932). 
123 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
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Moreover, the second rationale of the Copyright Act, to induce 
creative genius through copyright protection,124 is not served in the 
typical block-booking arrangement.  Because film distributors are 
assigned all the rights to content for film production125 or because 
the content of a film is made through work-for-hire agreements,126 
the creators are already compensated for their work by the time the 
feature is involved in a block-booking arrangement.127  Enabling a 
licensor to engage in block-booking and reap the benefits of the 
copyright monopoly128 would therefore not encourage creative 
genius where the licensor was not the creator in the first place.  
Thus, preventing the block-booking arrangement does not 
discourage creation, since the creators of film content have already 
been compensated.129  Because the block-booking arrangement 
does not further the policies of the Copyright Act,130 the antitrust 
laws should be broadly interpreted to prevent this type of 
arrangement.131  On the other hand, impeding a licensors ability to 
distribute programming on its own terms may result in fewer 
purchases from screenwriters by distributors.132 Thus, any attempt 
                                                          
124 See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909). 
125 See Judith A. Silver, A Bad Dream: In Search of a Legal Framework 
For Copyright Infringement Claims Involving Digital Imagery in Motion Pictures, 35 
IDEA 407, 411 (1995). 
126 See Karen L. Gulick, Creative Control, Attribution, and the Need for Disclosure: A 
Study of Incentives in the Motion Picture Industry, 27 CONN. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994) 
(explaining that work-for-hire agreements join the efforts of director, choreographer, and 
screenwriter at the expense of the production company who in return is designated as 
author of the work for copyright purposes). 
127 See id. 
128 See Gulick, supra note 126. 
129 See Fields Prod. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87, 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
130 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) (reasoning that 
[i]t is said that the reward to the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of 
the products of his creative genius. But the reward does not serve its public purpose if it 
is not related to the quality of the copyright. Where a high quality film greatly desired is 
licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from the former and 
strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.). 
131 See LAWRENCE I. WOOD, PATENTS AND ANTITRUST LAW xiv (1942) (stating that the 
antitrust laws are directed to the public welfare and wherever possible those laws should 
be given the widest possible latitude.). 
132 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, COMPETITION 
POLICY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REPORT 8 (1989) (discussing how the 
application of competition laws to licensing agreements may indirectly affect the 
incentives to create by influencing market structure). 
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to regulate television block-booking could adversely affect the 
market for innovation,133 contrary to the policy of the Copyright 
Act.134 
Even if television programming is not sufficiently unique to 
provide the Supreme Court with an adequate basis for applying the 
Paramount Pictures holding135 to television block-booking 
arrangements, an outright rejection of the per se approach is still 
not justified under a State Oil Co. v. Khan analysis.136  State Oil 
dealt specifically with vertical price-fixing arrangements.137  In a 
vertical price-fixing arrangement, the supplier sets the prices at 
which distributors may sell their products, restraining their ability 
to sell in accordance with their own judgment.138  Although the 
Supreme Court held vertical maximum price-fixing to be illegal 
per se in Albrecht v. Herald Co.,139 the State Oil Court 
acknowledged that an outright ban on price discrimination actually 
prompted suppliers to enter the distribution market.140  With the 
rationale behind Albrecht eliminated,141 the Court declared that 
mere precedent did not justify continuing a strict per se standard 
on price-fixing142 where a rule of reason analysis would suffice.143 
                                                          
133 Id. 
134 See H.R. Rep. No. 2222, at 7 (1909). 
135 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948). 
136 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (stating that the rule of reason analysis can effectively identify 
anti-competitive conduct in vertical price-fixing arrangements as in most commercial 
arrangements subject to antitrust law). 
137 Id. (noting that while the inquiry in overruling Albrecht involved consideration of the 
antitrust laws in all vertical arrangements, State Oil was the first time since Albrecht that 
the Court confronted a maximum price-fixing arrangement). 
138 See Kiefe Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951). 
See also United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940) (stating that 
all business combinations formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, 
depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or 
foreign commerce are illegal per se). 
139 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
140 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (quoting 7 PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1635, at 395 (Supp. 1989)) (stating that [t]he ban on 
maximum resale price limitations declared in Albrecht in the name of dealer freedom 
has actually prompted many suppliers to integrate forward into distribution, thus 
eliminating the very independent trader for whom Albrecht professed solicitude.). 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 20 (stating that [i]n the area of antitrust law, there is a competing interest, well-
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While State Oil overruled Albrechts per se approach for vertical 
price-fixing,144 the decision does not stand for a rejection of per se 
illegality in the context of block-booking.145  In fact, the inhibiting 
result of Albrecht on dealer freedom whereby distributors enter the 
market instead of controlling prices,146 is not an issue in block-
booking.  As Broadcast Music147 illustrates, the business of 
providing copyrighted materials is strictly organized along the 
lines of composers, distributors, and exhibitors.  Moreover, 
safeguards exist to prevent vertical integration in the motion 
picture148 and television industries.149  Thus, the fear that 
distributors would vertically integrate by entering the exhibiting 
market was not the rationale for applying the per se standard in 
block-booking.  While the possibility that a small television 
network will face competition from larger network conglomerates 
always exists,150 antitrust law is primarily concerned with 
protecting interbrand competition.151  Thus, as long as the per se 
                                                                                                                                  
represented in this Courts decisions, in recognizing and adapting to changed 
circumstances and the lessons of accumulated experience.). 
143 Id. at 22 (reasoning that [i]n our view, rule of reason analysis will effectively identify 
those situations in which vertical maximum price fixing amounts to anticompetitive 
conduct.). 
144 See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968). 
145 See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1277-78 (11th 
Cir. 1999) (stating that State Oil does not stand for a rejection of the per se standard in 
any context other than in vertical maximum price-fixing). 
146 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 4 (1997) (noting that Albrechts theoretical 
justifications for its per se rule [was] that vertical maximum price fixing could interfere 
with dealer freedom. . . .). 
147 441 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). 
148 Southway Theatres Inc. v. Georgia Theater Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 1982) 
(stating that [a]lthough the motion picture industry was once vertically integrated, court 
decrees have forced distributors and producers to divest themselves of ownership in 
theatres.). 
149 See Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045 
(7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that for twenty years, F.C.C. regulations have prevented the 
ABC, NBC, and CBS networks from syndicating programs). 
150 See, e.g., Carol Matlack, Welcome to the Real World, BUS. WK., December 4, 2000, at 
54, 55 (stating that antitrust authorities have cleared the way for Vivendis takeover of 
Seagram Co., creating the worlds second largest media group and putting pressure on 
media giant AOL Time Warner). 
151 See Continental Television Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (1977) 
(explaining that interbrand competition is the competition among the manufacturers of 
the same generic product and is the primary concern of antitrust law. In contrast, 
intrabrand competition is the competition between the distributors of the product of a 
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rejection of block-booking arrangements continues to stimulate 
competition among distributors of television programming,152 there 
is no economic reason to extend State Oil to television block-
booking arrangements.153 
While the economic reasons that existed in State Oil for 
rejecting the per se approach154 in vertical price-fixing 
arrangements are not present in television block-booking 
arrangements,155 the legal reasoning differs as well.  While 
precedent consistently labels block-booking arrangements as 
illegal per se,156 the major cases involving vertical price-fixing 
vary in both facts and result.157 The Court has justified these 
                                                                                                                                  
particular manufacturer). When interbrand competition exists, it provides a significant 
check on the exploitation of intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers 
to substitute a different brand of the same product. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
14 (1997) (quoting 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 341-42 (1987)) (explaining 
that the Courts recent decisions recognize the possibility that a vertical restraint 
imposed by a single manufacturer or wholesaler may stimulate interbrand competition 
even as it reduces intrabrand competition); see also Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. 
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 726 (1988) (stating that the primary purpose of the antitrust laws is 
to protect interbrand competition). 
152 See United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962) (indicating that the 
adverse effects of illegal block-booking contracts included foreclosing other distributors 
being from selling to the stations). 
153 Compare MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 
1999) (reasoning that block-booking contracts will always merit per se illegality), with 
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15 (concluding that vertically imposed maximum prices no longer 
merit per se treatment). 
154 See State Oil, 522 U.S. at 15-18. 
155 See id. at 16-17. 
156 See Loews, 371 U.S. 38; United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); 
Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Co., 277 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six 
W. Retail Acquisition v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000). 
157 See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1950) (holding all 
business combinations formed for the purpose and with the effect of raising, depressing, 
fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce 
illegal per se); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911) 
(holding illegal agreements under which manufacturers or suppliers set the minimum 
resale prices to be charged by their distributors); Compare White Motor Co. v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (determining that too little was known about the competitive 
impact of a manufacturers assignment of exclusive territories to its distributors to treat it 
as per se unlawful), with United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) 
(holding that a suppliers imposition of territorial rights or franchises on the distributor 
was so obviously destructive of competition as to be per se illegal), and Albrecht v. 
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variations by emphasizing subtle factual distinctions in cases158 
while overlooking stare decisis.159  By contrast, since Paramount 
Pictures160 the courts have steadfastly held block-booking to be 
illegal per se.161 
The rationale for holding motion picture block-booking illegal 
per se in Paramount Pictures was to prevent improper extensions 
of the copyright monopoly.162  The Paramount Pictures decision 
relied upon the judicial history of patent law to buttress its 
rejection of block-booking arrangements.163  In light of the long-
                                                                                                                                  
Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that vertical maximum price-fixing constituted 
a per se violation of the Sherman Act). But see Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania 
Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling Schwinn and rejecting a per se rule in the context 
of vertical nonprice restrictions) and State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (overruling 
Albrecht and holding that vertical maximum price-fixing would be evaluated under the 
rule of reason standard). 
158 See, e.g., GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 51 n.19 (declining to comment on Albrechts per 
se treatment of vertical maximum price restrictions, noting that the issue involved 
significantly different questions of analysis and policy); Arizona v. Maricopa County 
Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982) (noting that the restraint was more defensible 
because it was vertical rather than horizontal); White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 261 (stating 
that too little was known about the competitive impact of a manufacturers assignment of 
exclusive territories to its distributors to be treated as per se unlawful). 
159 Cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (stating that stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that in most matters it is 
more  important  that  the  applicable  rule  of  law be settled than that it be settled right); 
but see Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (commenting that stare decisis is 
the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of 
the judicial process.). Compare Ill. Brick Co. v. Ill., 431 U.S. 720, 736 (1977) 
(expressing reluctance to overrule decisions involving statutory interpretation), with Natl 
Socy of Prof. Engrs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 688 (1978) (stating that the general 
presumption that legislative changes should be left to Congress has less force with 
respect to the Sherman Act). 
160 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
161 See, e.g., MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
162 Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 157 (1948) (agreeing with the district courts 
finding that block-booking adds to the monopoly of a single copyrighted picture that of 
another copyrighted picture which must be taken and exhibited in order to secure the 
first.). 
163 334 U.S. at 157 (citing Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. United States, 309 U.S. 436, 459 
(1940)) (stating [t]hat enlargement of the monopoly of the copyright was condemned 
below in reliance on the principle that forbids the owner of a patent to condition its use 
on the purchase or use of patented or unpatented materials.); Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-
Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 
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standing patent precedent164 and the courts clear rejection of 
block-booking arrangements,165 television block-booking 
arrangements warrant a per se approach.166  Thus, unlike the 
vertical price-fixing cases,167 the Supreme Court could not rely on 
inconsistent precedent168 to change its per se approach in this 
unusual tying arrangement.169 On the other hand, the present 
Supreme Court has relinquished long-standing doctrine in the 
past170 and could once again apply policy over precedent in 
addressing the issue of block-booking.171 
In light of consistent precedent for adhering to the per se 
approach in television block-booking arrangements,172 the 
approach should continue to be applied in the name of judicial 
efficiency.173  Although antitrust law warrants innovation through 
                                                                                                                                  
U.S. 488, 491 (1942). 
164 See, e.g., Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488. 
165 See United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131 (1948); Pape Television Co. v. Associated Artists Prod. Corp., 277 
F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1960); Six W. Retail Acquisition, Inc. v. Sony Theatre Mgmt. Corp., 
No. 97 Civ. 5499, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2604, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000). 
166 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 401-02 (1968) 
(stating that courts must take the Copyright Act as they find it and only Congress may 
accommodate the competing considerations of copyright, communications and antitrust 
policy). 
167 See, e.g., Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951); 
United States v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
168 See, e.g., Theee Movies of Tarzana, 828 F.2d at 1399. 
169 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 9 (1984) (stating that 
[i]t is far too late in the history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition 
that certain tying arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and 
therefore are unreasonable per se.). 
170 See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (overruling Aguilar v. Felton, 473 
U.S. 402 (1985) and rejecting the long-standing principle that public school teachers on 
parochial school premises are assumed to inculcate religious doctrine). 
171 One example of the Courts placement of policy over precedent occurred in the 
context of public aid to parochial schools. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) 
(declaring that anti-Catholic sentiment has existed in this country for far too long). 
172 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
173 See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (stating that stare decisis is 
the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent 
development of legal principles.). Cf. Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 732-33 (1988) (stating that [o]f course the common law, both in general and as 
embodied in the Sherman Act, does not lightly assume that the economic realities 
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common law rather than static application of rigid rules,174 
innovation in technology increases lawsuits.175  A per se rule 
would not only alleviate clogged dockets,176 but also ensure that 
interbrand competition thrives in the media marketplace in 
accordance with the spirit of antitrust law.177  This would entail 
giving a small local network like PIC the choice to exhibit 
programming without the limitations of a block-booking 
arrangement.  On the other hand, because of innovation in the 
television industry,178 the per se standard for block-booking may 
have become an antiquated rule in the television context.179  Block-
booking may be the only method by which a financially challenged 
network can procure programming.  In block-booking agreements, 
the licensor foregoes cash payment in exchange for the stations 
                                                                                                                                  
underlying earlier decisions have changed, or that earlier judicial perceptions of those 
realities were in error. It is relevant, therefore, whether the common law of restraint of 
trade  ever prohibited as illegal per se an agreement of the sort made here, and whether 
our decisions under section 1 of the Sherman Act have ever expressed or necessarily 
implied such a prohibition.). 
174 See Bus. Elecs., 485 U.S. at 732 (stating that restraint of trade in violation of § 1 of the 
Sherman Act invokes the common law itself and not merely the static content that the 
common law had assigned to the term in 1890.); see also United States v. Arnold, 
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 392 (1967) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that the state 
of the common law 400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before us: the 
effect of the antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American 
economy today.). 
175 See, e.g., Cmty. Television of S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983) 
(acknowledging the public interest in making television broadcasting more available yet 
reasoning that standard should be the same whether public or private); Microsoft v. 
United States, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000); Addamax Corp. v. Open Software 
Found., Inc., 152 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 1998); Carol Matlack, Welcome to the Real World, 
BUS. WK., Dec. 4, 2000, at 54, 55 (stating that to win European antitrust approval, 
Vivendi had to promise that Vivendi Universals content would be freely available to 
competing distributors after the takeover). 
176 Steven E. Feldman et al., Mandatory Disclosure and Rocket Dockets: Accelerating the 
Processes of Litigation, 456 PLI/Pat. 269, 283 (Nov. 1996) (stating that [s]ection 471 of 
the Civil Justice Reform Act requires that each United States District Court implement a 
Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan to facilitate deliberate adjudication of 
civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure 
just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes.). 
177 See Natl Collegiate Athletic Assn v. Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 n.36 (1984). 
178 See Turner Broad. v. Fed. Communications Commn., 910 F. Supp. 734 (D.D.C. 
1995). 
179 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 21 (1997) (stating that this court has 
reconsidered its decisions construing the Sherman Act when the theoretical 
underpinnings of those decisions are called into serious question.). 
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willingness to accept a program he might not desire.180  Continuing 
with the per se approach to block-booking arrangements could 
therefore foreclose the small, independent competitor offering 
alternatives to viewers that opt out of cable.  Thus, the per se 
approach more easily enables large conglomerates to dominate the 
market.181  In light of these possible effects of applying the per se 
approach, using the rule of reason to evaluate block-booking 
arrangements might enhance competition in the television industry. 
B. The Per Se Standard Should not Apply to Block-Booking 
Arrangements 
The Supreme Court has stated that only the most anti-
competitive arrangements deserve the strict per se approach,182 and 
that the number of arrangements warranting this approach has 
declined with time.183  Tying arrangements,184 especially those 
arrangements which expand a copyright holders monopoly over 
his copyright,185 have traditionally warranted the per se approach.  
However, in Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,186 the 
Supreme Court acknowledged the circumstances under which per 
                                                          
180 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
181 See id.  In MCA, Public Interest Corporation was a typical public television network. 
182 See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that only those 
arrangements having a pernicious effect on competition and lacking any redeeming virtue 
should be classified as per se violations of the Sherman Act); see also State Oil, 522 U.S. 
at 10 (noting the courts own reluctance to adopt per se rules). 
183 State Oil, 522 U.S. at 21 (quoting Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 
717, 731-32 (1988)) (stating that although economic realities underlying earlier decisions 
may not have changed, different types of agreements may amount to restraints of trade in 
varying times and circumstances); see also id. (reasoning that it would make no sense to 
create out of the single term restraint of trade a chronologically schizoid statute, in 
which a rule of reason evolves with new circumstances and new wisdom, but a line of 
per se illegality remains forever fixed where it was.). 
184 Besides block-booking, examples of tying arrangements include franchisor restrictions 
of a franchisee, distributors territorial restrictions of a retailer, and maximum price 
setting agreements. 
185 See United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962) (stating that [w]here a high 
quality film greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows 
quality from the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.). 
186 466 U.S. 2 (1984). 
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se illegality is inappropriate.187  Jefferson Parish involved a 
hospital tying arrangement of surgical operations and 
anesthesiologist services.188  Although Jefferson Parish did not 
involve the tie-in of intellectual property, the Courts elaborate 
inquiry into the market for the hospitals services to patients189 
reflected a rule of reason approach.190  The Court examined 
whether the price, quality, supply or demand for the tying or tied 
product had been adversely affected.191  Because an elaborate 
inquiry192 led the Court to find that this tying arrangement failed to 
unreasonably restrain trade,193 a precedent for upholding other 
tying arrangements now exists. 
Applying the Courts criteria for upholding the tying 
arrangement in Jefferson Parish194 to the Courts decision to hold 
block-booking illegal per se in Paramount Pictures195 indicates 
that a similar arrangement would not always unreasonably restrain 
trade.  The Paramount Pictures Court never addressed whether the 
price, quality, supply or demand for the tying or tied product had 
been adversely affected,196 and instead relied heavily on the patent 
law cases.197  Furthermore, the Paramount Pictures Court was 
concerned about the vertical combination of producing, 
distributing, and exhibiting motion pictures among the five major 
motion picture producers.  This vertical combination further 
compounded the anti-competitive effects of the block-booking 
arrangement.198  The special circumstances of the motion picture 
                                                          
187 See id. at 18 (explaining that when the seller lacks the requisite market power to force 
customers to purchase an unwanted product, a plaintiff can only prove an antitrust 
violation by presenting evidence of an unreasonable restraint on competition in the 
relevant market). 
188 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18. 
189 Id. at 31 (stating that there is no evidence that the price, the quality, or the supply or 
demand for either the tying product or the tied product involved in this case has been 
adversely affected.). 
190 Id. at 18-22. 
191 Id. at 18. 
192 Id. at 26-32. 
193 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984). 
194 Id. 
195 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 156-59 (1948). 
196 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 31. 
197 See id. at 21 n.30. 
198 See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 140-41. 
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industry caused a restraint of interstate trade in the distribution and 
exhibition of films.199  While adding a block-booking arrangement 
to this vertical combination would have unreasonably restrained 
trade,200 the Courts finding of per se illegality was too broad.  At 
the very least, the Court has relinquished its disdain for vertical 
arrangements,201 a condition that led to the Paramount Pictures 
holding.202  Thus, the Court should again address its standard for 
block-booking under State Oil. 
The State Oil Court indicated that the concerns inducing the 
Albrecht Court to find vertical maximum price fixing illegal per 
se203 no longer justified this harsh standard.204  The Court further 
noted the lack of cases directed against the type of conduct 
condemned in Albrecht.205  Applying State Oils rationale to block-
booking, a court could clearly identify how and when a block-
booking arrangement would result in an unreasonable restraint of 
trade.206  Furthermore, the infrequency with which the Court has 
addressed block-booking207 and the fact that these suits were never 
brought by a private party, may indicate the extent to which block-
booking facilitates transactions with exhibitors.  Continuing with a 
per se standard could increase transaction costs where a block-
                                                          
199 See id. at 141. 
200 See id. 
201 See, e.g., Contl Television, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling 
Schwinn); see also Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 152-54 (1968) (vertical 
maximum price-fixing is a per se antitrust violation); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 
20 (1997)  (overruling Albrecht). 
202 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 143-44 (1948). 
203 State Oil, 522 U.S. at 16-18 (observing that the justifications for applying the per se 
standard to vertical maximum price-fixing in Albrecht included interference with dealer 
freedom, restriction on dealers ability to offer essential or desired services and a disguise 
for minimum price-fixing schemes). 
204  Id. at 15 (stating that it [is] difficult to maintain that vertically-imposed maximum 
price fixing could harm consumers or competition to the extent necessary to justify [its] 
per se invalidation.). 
205 Id. at 18-19. 
206 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 159 (1948) 
(suggesting that films may be sold in blocks or groups without a requirement to purchase 
more than one film). 
207 To date, the Supreme Court has only addressed block-booking in two cases. See id.; 
see also United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47 (1962). 
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booking arrangement might be in the parties best interests.208  On 
the other hand, despite the State Oil Courts thorough analysis of 
arrangements warranting the per se standard, block-booking was 
not mentioned.209  This oversight could indicate that the vertical 
block-booking arrangement is a beast of its own, best analyzed in 
accordance with other tying cases involving intellectual 
property.210 
While the Supreme Courts finding that block-booking 
arrangements are illegal per se rests in part on the principle that a 
copyright holder may not expand his monopoly,211 this rationale is 
weak in the television block-booking context.  The patent law 
cases,212 on which the copyright tying case relies,213 focus on 
preventing a distributor from exploiting the uniqueness of his 
invention.214  Although the Eleventh Circuit recently relied on 
precedent prohibiting copyright exploitation215 and found the 
television block-booking arrangement in MCA illegal per se,216 the 
facts of that case217 indicate that this precedent does not carry the 
same weight in television block-booking as in patent law or other 
tying cases.218 
                                                          
208 For example, Albrecht gave rise to litigation between distributors and publishers in the 
newspaper industry. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 16 (1997) (citing P. AREEDA 
& H. HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, at 599-614 (Supp. 1996)). 
209 See id. at 10-22. 
210 See B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1941); Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. 
Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Motion Pictures Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. 
Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
211 See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 157-58. 
212 See e.g., B.B. Chemical, 314 U.S. 495 (1941); Morton Salt, 314 U.S. 488 (1941); 
Motion Pictures, 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
213 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 
156-59 (1948). 
214 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127 (1932) (stating that [t]he sole interest of 
the United States and the primary object in conferring the monopoly lie in the general 
benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.). 
215 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 
1276-79 (11th Cir. 1999). 
216 See id. 
217 See infra Part I. 
218 See Intl Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Ethyl Gasoline Corp. v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 436 (1940); see also N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 
(1958); Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293, 305-06 (1949). 
FINAL.LAB 1/10/02  5:09 PM 
222 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:195 
 
First, the danger of a creator attempting to exploit his monopoly 
by receiving the same price for an inferior program through tying 
is absent where, as in MCA, the distributor is not the creator, but a 
licensor of the program.219  Second, the television block-booking 
arrangement bears a greater resemblance to the Broadcast Music 
blanket licensing arrangement,220 or the film clearances in Orson,  
which the Court refused to declare illegal per se.221 
The Supreme Courts refusal to find the blanket license illegal 
per se in Broadcast Music222 resulted from an examination into the 
television network industry.223  The Court found that the blanket 
license offered by ASCAP and BMI was more efficient than 
individual negotiations between networks and composers.224  This 
efficiency, coupled with individual negotiations if the smaller 
networks so desired,225 led the Court to find that the blanket license 
                                                          
219 Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398 (1968) (stating 
that while the television broadcaster does less than the motion picture exhibitor because 
he only supplies electronic signals, courts have nonetheless treated broadcasters as 
exhibitors). 
220 See Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. American Socy of Composers, 400 F. Supp. 737, 
741 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The blanket license gives licensees the right to perform any and all 
of the compositions owned by the members as often as the licensees desire for a stated 
term. Radio and television broadcasters are the largest users of the blanket license. Fees 
are ordinarily a percentage of total revenues or a flat dollar amount and do not ordinarily 
depend on the amount or type of music used. Thus, the broadcast network may in fact 
receive music in the blanket license that it otherwise might not desire or that is not worth 
the flat rate. The blanket license has been considered a clearinghouse for copyright 
owners and users to solve the problems associated with music licensing. 
221 See Orson Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1370-72 (3d Cir. 1996). 
222 441 U.S. 1 (1979). 
223 Id. at 14-15 (stating that [t]he extraordinary number of users spread across the land, 
the ease with which a performance may be broadcast, the sheer volume of copyrighted 
compositions, the enormous quantity of separate performances each year, the 
impracticability of negotiating individual licenses for each composition, and the 
ephemeral nature of each performance all combine to create unique market conditions for 
performance rights to recorded music.) (quoting Mem. for U.S. as Amicus Curiae on 
Pet. for Cert. in K-91, Inc. v. Gershwin Publg Corp., O.T. 1967, No. 147, at 10-11 
(1979)). 
224 Id. at 20 (explaining that [a] middleman with a blanket license was an obvious 
necessity if the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be 
avoided. Also, individual fees for the use of individual compositions would presuppose 
an intricate schedule of fees and uses, as well as a difficult and expensive reporting 
problem for the user and policing task for the copyright owner.). 
225  See id. at 12 (acknowledging that there are no practical impediments preventing 
direct dealing by the television networks if they so desire.). 
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did not warrant per se illegality.226  The fact that networks were 
forced to purchase some songs that they otherwise might not desire 
was a small disadvantage in light of the conveniences conferred by 
the blanket license.227 
Just as the blanket license insures that smaller networks are not 
shut out of the bidding process for the works of various composers 
and publishers,228 block-booking in the television industry 
enhances the attractiveness of a small exhibitor with little 
bargaining power to a powerful distributor commonly engaged in 
the practice.229  Although the television block-booking 
arrangement may cause a network to accept a program the network 
would not otherwise exhibit,230 the arrangement enables the 
smaller network to remain competitive.  Without block-booking, 
the distributor may find other takers in the vast television 
industry.231  Because many exhibitors depend upon the same 
distributor to remain in business, the Supreme Court will be 
inhibiting free enterprise should it continue to apply a per se 
standard to television block-booking.  As Broadcast Music 
illustrates,   the   Supreme   Court  has  previously  recognized  that 
                                                          
226 See id. at 24 (declaring that the blanket license should be subject to a more 
discriminating examination under the rule of reason.). 
227 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 22 (1979); see 
also E. Scott Johnson, Considering the Source-Licensing Threat to Performing Rights in 
Music Copyrights, 6 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 1, 10 (1989) (noting that 
[c]onvenience is the key to the blanket license. For certain music users, such as 
nightclubs and restaurants, a blanket license is virtually imperative [because] [i]t is 
practically impossible for such users to predict their musical requirements far enough in 
advance to procure all the individual licenses needed to present variety entertainment.). 
228 See Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 21 (1979) 
(explaining that ASCAP provides the necessary resources for blanket sales and 
enforcement, resources unavailable to the vast majority of composers and publishing 
houses). 
229 See Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Commn, 98 F.2d 1043, 1047 
(7th Cir. 1992) (highlighting the fact that with the repeal of the F.C.C. rules, ABC, NBC, 
and CBS are now permitted to syndicate programming). 
230 See MCA Television v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 1999). 
231 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 402 (1968) 
(examining whether an entrepreneur who erected television antennas syndicating 
broadcasts of copyrighted materials did not violate the Copyright Act because of due 
regard to changing technology). 
FINAL.LAB 1/10/02  5:09 PM 
224 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:195 
 
special needs of certain industries cannot be addressed by a 
sweeping rule such as the per se standard.232 
In the case of clearances,233 the Court refused to apply the per se 
standard despite recognition that clearances had dangerous 
potential and similarities to the then per se illegal practice of price-
fixing.234  Lower courts addressing clearances today have 
recognized the pro-competitive effects that the practice has in the 
motion picture industry.235 Although clearances also exploit the 
copyright monopoly by exclusively licensing a copyrighted 
feature, thereby advantaging some exhibiting theaters and 
disadvantaging others,236 courts have used the rule of reason to 
identify where this exclusive licensing actually restrains trade.237 A 
similar approach should apply to block-booking.  On the other 
hand, when a distributor exclusively licenses a film as a clearance, 
he is not tying that film to any other copyrighted feature, in 
violation of cases indicating that tying intellectual property is 
illegal per se.238  Overcoming this precedent could prove to be 
difficult. 
Although the Supreme Court has stated that the benefits of a 
sweeping per se rule lie in the judicial efficiency created once 
experience shows the anti-competitiveness of an arrangement,239 
                                                          
232 See, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972) (declaring that professional 
baseball qualifies for an antitrust exemption given baseballs unique characteristics and 
needs). 
233 See generally Orson, Inc. v. Miramax Film Corp., 79 F.3d 1358, 1370 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(providing a general discussion of what clearances are). 
234 United States v. Paramount Pictures Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 148 (1948) (stating that 
[c]learances have been used along with price fixing to suppress competition with the 
theatres of the exhibitor-defendants and with other favored exhibitors. The District Court 
could therefore have eliminated clearances completely for a substantial period of time, 
even though, as it thought, they were not illegal per se.). 
235 See Orson, 79 F.3d at 1372 (finding that the clearances promoted interbrand 
competition by requiring the Roxy to seek out and exhibit other distributors films). 
236 See id. (conceding that the clearances reduced intrabrand competition by disallowing 
the Roxy from showing on a first-run basis any Miramax film that the Ritz had 
selected). 
237 See id. at 1371 (stating that clearances are subject to rule of reason treatment as 
vertical non-price restraints of trade). 
238 See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1941); Motion Pictures 
Patent Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917). 
239 See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that 
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the requisite experience is difficult to achieve in media industries 
such as television that are constantly changing.  Since the advent of 
cable television, courts have been forced to reexamine their 
holdings in an effort to keep pace with change.240  While a merger 
or affiliation with a major network may be efficient for the small 
network,241 a conglomerate could lead to a monopoly in violation 
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.242  The terms of a block-booking 
arrangement, while running the risk of being unfavorable to a 
network, may also increase competition by keeping that network in 
business.  A court applying a per se standard without looking into 
a particular industrys circumstances would undoubtedly eliminate 
cases on the judicial docket.243  However, economic efficiency 
should not be sacrificed in the name of judicial efficiency. 
III. REASON SHOULD RULE IN TELEVISION BLOCK-BOOKING 
In State Oil, a landmark case in the Supreme Courts Sherman 
Act jurisprudence, the Court noted the necessity of reevaluating the 
Albrecht standard of per se illegality in the context of vertical price 
fixing244 in light of post-Albrecht decisions.245  Since Paramount 
                                                                                                                                  
per se treatment is justified [o]nce experience with a particular kind of restraint enables 
the Court to predict with confidence that the rule of reason will condemn it.). 
240 See, e.g., Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 1043, 
1055-57 (7th Cir. 1992) (ordering the F.C.C. to readdress its restrictions on the major 
networks). 
241 See id. at 1053 (discussing the fact that many weak independent stations have become 
affiliates of the new major network, Fox). 
242 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2001) (providing that[e]very person who shall monopolize, or attempt 
to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize 
any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall 
be deemed guilty of a felony.). 
243 The elaborate inquiry into the reasonableness of a challenged business practice entails 
significant costs. Litigation surrounding effect or purpose of a practice is often 
extensive and complex.  See N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958); see 
also Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Socy, 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) (stating that for 
the sake of litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some agreements 
that a full blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable.). 
244 State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (stating that [a] review of this Courts 
decisions leading up to and beyond Albrecht is relevant to our assessment of the 
continuing validity of the per se rule established in Albrecht.). 
245 See, e.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (holding that vertical maximum 
price-fixing constituted a per se violation of the Sherman Act); United States v. Arnold, 
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Pictures,246 the Supreme Court has not addressed the appropriate 
standard to be applied in television block-booking arrangements.  
Because MCA illustrates the stifling effect that this decision has 
had on television block-booking arrangements,247 the Supreme 
Court should re-address this issue in light of post-Paramount 
Pictures decisions.248  The alternative of continuing with the per se 
standard would only sacrifice the benefits that some arrangements 
would otherwise create.249 
A. Evaluating the Television Block-Booking Arrangement under 
the Rule of Reason Standard would Serve the Public Interest. 
Although tying arrangements were declared illegal per se in 
International Salt,250 some forty years later in Jefferson Parish251 
the Courts elaborate inquiry into a tying arrangement was 
considered a full rule of reason approach.252  Although the Court 
refused to reject the notion that some tying arrangements might so 
stifle competition as to be illegal per se,253 the Court willingly 
considered the pro-competitive effects of the hospitals 
                                                                                                                                  
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (holding that a suppliers imposition of territorial 
rights or franchises on the distributor was so obviously destructive of competition as to be 
per se illegal) White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (determining that 
too little was known about the competitive impact of a manufacturers assignment of 
exclusive territories to its distributors to be treated as per se unlawful).  But see State Oil 
Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997) (overruling Albrecht and holding that vertical 
maximum price-fixing would be evaluated under the rule of reason standard); Continental 
T.V. Inc., v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977) (overruling Schwinn and rejecting a 
per se rule in the context of vertical nonprice restrictions). 
246 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948). 
247 MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1279 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that unless and until the Supreme Court explicitly overrules [Paramount] and 
[Loews], we must adhere to the rule they establish.). 
248 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 31 (1984); see also 
State Oil, 522 U.S. at 22. 
249 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 35 (OConnor, J., concurring) (reasoning that [t]he 
time has therefore come to abandon the per se label and refocus the inquiry on the 
adverse economic effects, and the potential economic benefits, that the tie may have.). 
250 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947). 
251 466 U.S. at 29. 
252 See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 492-93 (discussing how use of the separate demand test 
in Jefferson Parish resulted in the courts adoption of a full rule of reason standard). 
253 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 9. 
FINAL.LAB 1/10/02  5:09 PM 
2001] IF PER SE IS DYING, WHY NOT IN TV TYING? 227 
 
arrangement wherein the hospital tied anesthesiological services to 
surgical care.254 As a result, the hospitals defense that its tying of 
services reduced costs to patients overcame the presumption of per 
se illegality.255 Should the Court continue to accept defenses that a 
particular arrangement promotes consumer interest under a rule of 
reason analysis,256 more tying arrangements would be upheld, 
including television block-booking. 
Applying a consumer best interest defense to the MCA case 
indicates that the Eleventh Circuit may have found the television 
block-booking arrangement to have merit in that instance.  The 
Eleventh Circuit rejected MCAs argument that PIC desired the 
block-booking arrangement not because the arrangement was 
unique but rather, because PIC had no money and MCA offered 
the licenses for barter.257 The block-booking arrangement 
decreased the costs to PIC as a consumer of distributor 
programming. 
PICs lack of funds suggests that there may have been no 
alternative programming from other distributors.  The resulting 
consequence of one less independent television network at a time 
when high cost cable companies were accused of monopolizing the 
market258 would have reduced competition.259 Thus, had the 
Eleventh Circuit considered a business justification for the block-
booking  arrangement  under  the rule of reason as did the Supreme  
                                                          
254 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25. 
255 See Anlauf, supra note 21, at 493 (citing Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 25 n.42). 
256 See id. at n.137 (discussing how consideration of a goodwill defense is new to tying 
analysis under the Sherman Act). 
257 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1278 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
258 See Laura Land Sigal, Challenging The Telco-Cable Cross Ownership Ban: First 
Amendment and Antitrust Implications For the Interactive Information Highway, 22 
FORDAHM URB. L.J. 207, 238 (1994) (noting that cable television remains the dominant 
medium for providing consumers with multiple channels of video programming.). 
259 See id. at 239 (explaining that through ownership of the cable connection, cable 
operators have control over most of the television programming channeled into a home 
enabling the cable operator to easily block out competitors). 
FINAL.LAB 1/10/02  5:09 PM 
228 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol.12:195 
 
Court in Jefferson Parish,260 the court would have found that the 
block-booking arrangement enhanced competition in MCA. 
Because the Sherman Act is meant to regulate only those 
arrangements involving substantial volumes of commerce,261 
whether the block-booking arrangement in MCA would have 
stifled competition should be assessed beyond whether the 
arrangement was in PICs best interest.262 Examining the 
consequences of the MCA arrangement on a broad scale indicates 
that the arrangements effects would have served the interests of all 
television programming consumers, including viewers. 
As noted earlier in this section, PICs restricted funding likely 
limited the networks ability to choose among program 
distributors, even to the point that foregoing MCAs arrangement 
might have resulted in no programming at all.  In light of this 
limitation, the notion that television stations forced to accept 
block-booking arrangements are denied access to features 
marketed by other distributors263 is seriously undermined.  In a 
time where television viewers opting out of multi-channel 
operators are already limited in their choices,264 the independent 
television broadcast market needs as many competitors as 
possible.265 If block-booking arrangements assist some 
independent broadcasters in providing viewing alternatives in the 
marketplace,266 then courts should consider the possibility of 
                                                          
260 See Anlauf, supra note 21, at n.137. 
261 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 16 (1984) (citing Fortner 
Enters. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1969)). 
262 See id. (stating that [i]f only a single purchaser were forced with respect to the 
purchase of a tied item, the resultant impact on competition would not be sufficient to 
warrant the concern of antitrust law.). 
263 See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 48-49 (1962). 
264 See Sigal, supra note 258, at 238-39. 
265 See Schurz Communications Inc. v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 1043, 
1051 (7th Cir. 1992)(stating that the F.C.C. sought to increase diversity in the television 
marketplace when enacting the 1970 F.C.C. rules). 
266 For example, one may infer that prior to MCAs lawsuit against PIC, PIC benefited 
from the block-booking arrangement; otherwise, it would not have entered into a contract 
with MCA in the first place.  Moreover, it may have found the arrangement desirable 
because it complained only in a counterclaim to MCAs action for breach of contract and 
copyright infringement. 
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assistance before rejecting these arrangements.267 Because only a 
rule of reason standard in accordance with Jefferson Parish would 
recognize a best interest defense, the rule of reason should 
become the relevant standard in television block-booking 
arrangements. 
C.    A Rule of Reason Standard can Best Identify when Television 
Block-Booking Arrangements Stimulate Interbrand 
Competition, a Primary Concern of Antitrust Law. 
In rejecting a per se standard for vertical maximum price-fixing, 
the State Oil Court noted that the primary purpose of the Sherman 
Act is to stimulate interbrand competition.268 The Court further 
reasoned that maximum price-fixing, to the extent that it lowers 
prices for a product,269 actually enhances competition among 
suppliers.270 Moreover, the Court found that the fears271 behind 
holding maximum price-fixing illegal per se272 could not be 
accurately predicted in every situation.273 Because a per se 
standard  assumes that the effects of vertical maximum price-fixing  
                                                          
267 See Loews, 371 U.S. at 51. In Loews, the distributor argued that the block-booking 
arrangement was a by-product of the television stations requiring a loan in which the 
guarantor required a minimum number of ads. Since the television station could not 
telecast all the ads without a large number of films over which to spread the ads, a block-
booking arrangement was necessary to facilitate the transaction. Without considering the 
merit of the argument, the Court rejected it because the antitrust laws cannot be avoided 
by claiming a business justification. Inherent in this argument, however, is the 
assumption that the arrangement restrains rather than facilitates competition. 
268 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 15 (1997). 
269 See id. at 7. State Oil had allegedly prevented retailers from raising prices higher than 
its suggested price and collected the excess through rebates. 
270 See id. at 15 (stating that [c]utting prices in order to increase business often is the 
very essence of competition) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986)). 
271 See id. at 14-16 (explaining that these fears include predatory pricing, restrictions on 
dealer freedom, diminished incentives for provision of services, and a mask for minimum 
price setting, which is illegal per se). 
272 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 145. 
273 See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 14-16. 
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are always illegal,274 the Court decided that the rule of reason 
standard would identify an illegal arrangement.275 
Because block-booking may increase interbrand competition 
under certain circumstances, a sweeping per se rule is not 
necessary.  The rule of reason standard would better identify when 
there is a reduction in competition.  The television industry 
maintains two levels of suppliers: the licensors of programming 
like MCA, who supply to the broadcast networks, and the 
broadcast networks who supply to television viewers.276  Thus, any 
analysis as to whether interbrand competition is increased must be 
evaluated at both levels. 
Because block-booking ties an inferior television program to a 
bundle of competitive programs,277 the distributor is able to obtain 
an above market price for the lesser program.278 To the extent that 
the arrangement enables the distributor to operate profitably,279 the 
arrangement would ensure the presence of multiple distributors.  
More distributors would translate into more leverage for networks 
and less probability that a contract could be forced on a financially 
challenged network such as MCA, because a distributor would 
know that a network could go elsewhere. 
Furthermore, where the block-booking arrangement is 
exchanged on a barter basis because the scheme includes less 
desirable programming,280 the block-booking arrangement has the 
effect of lowering broadcast networks costs.  This reduction in 
costs could be passed on to consumers in the form of increased 
programming offerings.  As a result, more networks would 
                                                          
274 See Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 165-66 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
275 See State Oil Co., 522 U.S. at 17. 
276 Schurz Communications v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 1043, 1045 (7th 
Cir. 1992) (reasoning that [t]he networks can just as well be viewed as sellers of a 
distribution service as they can be as buyers of programs.). 
277 See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948). 
278 See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 52 (1962) (stating that any final 
judgment against the block-booking program distributors must prohibit non-cost justified 
differentials in price between a film when sold individually and when sold in a package). 
279 See Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. at 159 (rejecting Columbia Pictures argument that 
restricting block-booking would impair its ability to operate profitably). 
280 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
FINAL.LAB 1/10/02  5:09 PM 
2001] IF PER SE IS DYING, WHY NOT IN TV TYING? 231 
 
continue to broadcast, thereby increasing interbrand 
competition.281 The per se standard would never include such an 
in-depth analysis.  Because the rule of reason would take such 
benefits into account and punish block-booking arrangements that 
did not stimulate interbrand competition, the rule of reason test is 
best suited for the complicated circumstances of block-booking 
arrangements. 
D.   The Rule of Reason Standard will Adequately Identify Any 
Exploitation of the Copyright Monopoly because the Risk for 
Misuse of the Copyright Act is Diminished in Television Block-
Booking. 
While the Court has stated that the assumption of market power 
is still present in the instance of a television film,282 the Court has 
not addressed the issue in the context of a television series. 
The television industry has changed tremendously since Loews, 
when the Supreme Court held block-booking to be illegal per se.283  
At that time, just three networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) dominated 
the market by producing, exhibiting, and syndicating the 
programming.284  Today there is a large market of independent 
syndicators, like MCA.285 Many syndicated programs are reruns, 
broadcast by independent stations of series first shown on the 
major networks.286  While the number of small independent 
networks has increased fivefold since 1970, the number of 
                                                          
281 See, e.g., Paddock Publns Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 103 F.3d 42, 45-47 (7th Cir. 
1996) (rejecting the Chicago Herald newspapers argument that a mixture of exclusive 
contracts and other factors that endure despite short contract terms, hampers the growth 
of small rivals even though each market is competitive). 
282 See Loews, 371 U.S. at 48 (stating that [a] copyrighted feature film does not lose its 
legal or economic uniqueness because it is shown on a television rather than a movie 
screen.). 
283 See id. at 50. 
284 See, e.g., Schurz Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 
1043, 1045 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining how the FCC financial interest and syndication 
rules prevented ABC, NBC, and CBS from syndicating programs because they already 
held too much market power). 
285 See id. at 1046. 
286 See id. at 1045. 
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programming producers has decreased by forty percent in the last 
two decades.287  That PIC, an independent network with limited 
funds, could obtain a unique, first-run series through a block-
booking arrangement with a syndicated licensor, is significant.  
The inherent assumption for condemning block-booking in Loews 
was that the attachment of an inferior tied product caused the 
exploitation of the copyrights on the features in the rest of the 
package.  Because the market of syndicating first-run series for 
independent networks is slim,288 MCAs tying of a first-run series 
in a package with other first-run series could be viewed as an 
equalization, not an exploitation of copyright, especially since the 
majority of independent stations mainly broadcast reruns.289 
Even if the ability to syndicate a program as a rerun indicates the 
programs success290 and thus would be superior to tying a first-run 
series that might flop, the future success of a series is not known at 
the point of licensure.  Thus, any attempt to label the series as 
inferior is speculative at best.  The tied program in MCA, Harry, 
ran for two and a half years. 291  No evidence indicated that PIC 
would have stopped broadcasting Harry had MCA not sued for 
copyright infringement.  MCA sued and PIC cross-appealed on the 
grounds of a block-booking violation only after PIC failed to pay 
the cash portion of its contract.292  From the perspective of the 
present-day television industry,293 Harry was a success as a first-
run series. 
                                                          
287 See id. at 1046. 
288 See id. 
289 Cf. Schurz Communications, Inc. v. Fed. Communications Commn, 982 F.2d 1043, 
1051 (7th Cir. 1992). 
290 Id. at 1045 (stating that [v]ery few series are sufficiently successful in their initial run 
to be candidates for syndication. Independent stations like to air five episodes each week 
of a rerun series that originally had aired only once a week or less, so unless a series has a 
first run of several yearswhich few series doit will not generate enough episodes to 
sustain a rerun of reasonable length.). 
291 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
292 See id. at 1268-69. 
293 See, e.g., Schurz Communications, 982 F.2d at 1046 (stating that most television 
entertainment programs are money losers). 
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Given that most television programs are not money-makers,294 
the measure of a programs profitability should be distinguished 
from its desirability.  Where a distributor ties a feature because it is 
unprofitable, the distributor is clearly exploiting the copyright of 
the other features in the package.295  The risk of exploitation is 
more acute in motion picture block-booking where licensing 
arrangements generally provide distributors with a percentage of 
gross box office profits and guaranteed minimums, regardless of 
the films success.296  By contrast, distributors in the television 
industry are generally compensated through a fixed rate of 
advertising, 297 cash, or bartering.298  Thus, it is less probable that a 
distributor can exploit a copyrighted work in the television 
industry because capitalization and compensation are sought in the 
form of advertising during program viewing. 
Even where the program is undesirable from the exhibitors 
perspective,299 acceptance of the block-booking arrangement 
reflects freedom of contract more than the exploitation of 
copyright.300  To the extent that MCAs block-booking 
arrangement was unattractive to PIC, it had the incentive to seek 
out other program distributors.301  In this respect, the television 
                                                          
294 See id. 
295 See, e.g., United States v. Loews, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 41-43 (1962) (discussing how 
research indicated that the films tied would have been sold separately for much less). 
296 See Southway Theatres, Inc. v. Georgia Theatre Co., 672 F.2d 485, 488 (5th Cir. 
1982); but see Associated Film Distrib. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 614 F. Supp. 1100, 1103 
(E.D. Pa. 1985) (stating that [t]raditionally, terms under negotiated licenses are not firm. 
If a picture bombs, the distributor may renegotiate the terms downward.). 
297 See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 447 n.28 (1984) (stating 
that [t]he traditional method by which copyright owners capitalize upon the television 
medium is predicated upon the assumption that compensation for the value of displaying 
the works will be received in the form of advertising revenues.). 
298 See MCA Television Ltd. v. Pub. Interest Corp., 171 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
299 See Sony Corp., 464 U.S. 417.  The court should have made this distinction in MCA. 
300 But see Loews, 371 U.S. at 47 (reasoning that the reward does not serve its public 
purpose if it is not related to the quality of the copyright. Where a high quality film 
greatly desired is licensed only if an inferior one is taken, the latter borrows quality from 
the former and strengthens its monopoly by drawing on the other.). 
301 See Theee Movies of Tarzan v. Pacific Theatres, Inc., 828 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 
1987) (stating that clearances that a movie theater received from its distributor 
encouraged interbrand competition by forcing competitors to find alternative subrun 
movies to exhibit and promote); see also Paddock Publns Inc. v. Chicago Tribune Co., 
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block-booking arrangement stimulated competition among 
distributors of television programming.302  Furthermore, even if 
PIC did not have the means to pursue another program distributor 
and had to accept the terms of the block-booking arrangement, this 
single instance of thwarting would not be enough to impair 
competition in the entire market.303  If, however, a particular 
block-booking arrangement threatened a substantial volume of 
commerce,304 a court could effectively safeguard these policies 
under the rule of reasons balancing approach.305 
 CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has slowly expanded the rule of reason 
standard to accommodate business arrangements formerly 
relegated to per se illegality.  Vertical maximum price-fixing is the 
most recent of the arrangements to be set free of the per se stigma.  
As MCA illustrates, courts are hesitant to extend the rule of reason 
to vertical tying arrangements, at least in the television block-
booking context.  However, permitting television block-booking 
where it enables diverse programming and greater options for 
viewers is of great importance in this age of high price, all or 
nothing cable operators. The rule of reason test can adequately 
punish where the greatest effect of block-booking would be an 
unreasonable restraint of trade. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
103 F.3d 42, 46-47 (7th Cir. 1996) (distinguishing between exclusive dealing and 
exclusive distributorships and upholding the distributorship in the newspaper industry 
because none of the newspapers had promised by contract to obtain all news from a 
single source). 
302 See Paddock Publns, 103 F.3d at 47. 
303 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 18. 
304 See id. at 2. 
305 See id. at 40 n.10 (1984) (OConnor, J., concurring) (reasoning that [t]he examination 
of the economic advantages of tying may properly be conducted as part of the rule of 
reason analysis, rather than at the threshold of the tying inquiry.). 
